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Abstract:  
Since the late 1990s, new ideas and strategies concerning the role and shape of 
the Welfare State have been formulated. All these analyses and policy developments 
point towards a similar policy logic based on ‘social investment’. The aim of this 
paper is to map out the contours of this new perspective, both at the ideational level 
and in terms of the policies implemented throughout Europe. It also aims at assessing 
the achievements, as well as the shortcomings, of this strategy. In doing so it provides 
a critical analysis of the content and coherence of the social investment ideas and 
policies and opens up for a discussion of whether the social investment perspective 
can provide adequate responses to challenges such as population ageing, the impact of 
the economic crisis and environmental issues. 
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Since the late 1990s, new ideas and strategies concerning the role of social policy 
for societal development have been formulated. Around the world, many of these 
analyses and policy agendas point towards a similar policy logic based on “social 
investment”. The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of this social 
investment perspective both at the ideational level and in terms of the policies 
implemented in some of the most affluent countries in the world. By assessing the 
achievements, as well as the shortcomings, of social investment-oriented policies, we 
aim to provide the ground for a normative discussion of what is missing in the social 
investment approach. The question is whether the social investment perspective can 
provide adequate responses to the challenges of changes in the population structure, 
rising inequalities, unemployment, the impact of the financial crisis and 
environmental issues. We argue that this is contingent not only on the specific design 
of the policies where the quest for quality is a key element, but also on a successful 
combination with other policies that can reduce inequalities, notably social protection 
policies and policies aimed at promoting gender equality. Moreover, the social 
investment policies need a new macroeconomic framework and a political framing 
able to mobilize a majority of citizens. 
The early origins of social investment 
The early origins of the social investment perspective can be traced back to the 
early years of the social-democratic Swedish welfare state. Against the background of 
the Great Depression and a severe fertility crisis, Alva and Gunnar Myrdal developed 
a new conception of social policy oriented towards the efficient organisation of 
production and reproduction, and which viewed social policy as an investment rather 
than a cost. They developed their ideas in a number of reports and books, and most 
famously in their 1934 book Krisi befolkningsfrågan (‘Crisis in the population 
question’). Here they used the demographic argument to overcome the Conservatives’ 
resistance towards the development of a more ambitious social policy.  
Turning around the Conservatives’ concern with both the quantity and quality of 
the population, they put forward the argument that the decline in fertility was due to 
socio-economic hardship brought about by industrialisation and fast urbanisation: 
children were no longer seen as extra labour on the farm, but as an extra cost for 
households and an extra burden in overcrowded housing. Policies were therefore 
needed to provide economic support to families – both through cash transfers and 
through policies supporting a family in which both parents were working - and to 
improve housing standards in order to promote fertility. Increasing fertility was not an 
aim in itself, however. More important than the ‘quantity’ of the population was its 
‘quality’. Here the Myrdals addressed the Conservatives’ eugenic preoccupations with 
the quality of the Swedish population by arguing that the ‘quality of children’ was not 
biologically determined, but linked to socio-economic factors and to education 
(Appelqvist 2007).  
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While the Myrdals addressed the demographic concerns of the time, their 
argument was also, in a period of deep economic crisis, very much linked to a concern 
with economic growth and productivity: without a healthy and educated population 
that also reproduced itself, the productivity of the economy could not be sustained. 
Social policy was presented not simply as a means for the provision of individual 
security and redistribution, but also for the efficient organisation of production. This 
new understanding of the role of social policy was encapsulated under the term 
‘productive social policy’ which Gunnar Myrdal coined (Andersson 2005). 
‘Productive social policy’ can be interpreted as an economic discursive defence of 
solidarity and individual security, advocating social rights with reference to their 
effects on economic efficiency (Andersson 2005, 3-4). This is in some respects 
similar to the Keynesian understanding of economic growth and social policy but the 
Keynesian countercyclical demand-side macroeconomics was less oriented towards 
human capital development and investments in the future. 
 
Social investment, Keynesianism and Neo-liberalism 
Keynesianism rose to prominence in the wake of the Great Depression and came 
to dominate macro-economic policies across the OECD countries until the late 1970s 
(Hemerijck 2012). Keynesian economic theory offered a new understanding of the 
causes of slow growth and unemployment, linking them to problems of insufficient 
demand and of the natural tendency towards cyclical fluctuations of unfettered 
capitalism. Keynes saw government intervention in the economy in the form of 
monetary and fiscal policy as necessary for the stability of the economy. Public 
spending in particular could function as an important regulator which could be used to 
stimulate the economy at a time of a slump or to dampen growth if it happened too 
quickly. In this respect, spending on welfare policy was seen as a particularly useful 
economic tool, helping to balance the economy in periods of recession. 
While Keynesianism shared with the Myrdals’ productive social policy approach 
a belief in the mutually reinforcing qualities of social policy and economic growth, 
the two approaches also differ on a number of points. For one thing, the Keynesian 
welfare state development was based on a sort of class compromise but had a 
conservative blend. Unlike the Myrdal’s emphasis on supporting female labour 
market participation and gender equality, and on promoting children’s wellbeing and 
social rights, Keynesian employment and social policies very much supported the 
traditional family and the male breadwinner model (a model of family within which 
the man is taking paid work and the woman remai ns a housewife and is in charge 
with unpaid domestic and care work). Keynesian policies were primarily preoccupied 
with men’s employment opportunities, along with men’s social rights. While women 
and children also benefited from social benefits, this was through their link to a male 
breadwinner (Jenson 2012).   
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Keynesianism is also founded on a different notion of time than that associated 
with the productive social policy approach. In the latter approach, social policy was 
more explicitly conceptualised as an investment, which would yield returns not just in 
the present (propping up demand) but also in the future (notably through investment 
in the education and health of young children, and through investment in human 
capital more generally). The social policies developed under the Keynesian epoch in 
OECD countries were thus mainly ‘passive’ social policies to promote and sustain 
demand, notably through the development of cash-transfer programmes in the form of 
social insurances. 
Following the economic crisis of 1974 and Keynesian economic theory’s 
incapacity to explain and respond to the simultaneous rise in unemployment and 
inflation, Keynesian economic policies came under severe attack from proponents of 
neoliberal macroeconomic theory, ultimately leading to a paradigmatic shift from 
Keynesianism to monetarism which became the dominant economic ideas within 
international organisation and were progressively adopted by governments in the US 
and in Europe in the 1980s (Hall 1993). The new neo-liberal paradigm placed the 
emphasis on budgetary rigour, wage restraint, monetarism and corporate 
competitiveness (Jobert 1994). In this macro-economic thinking, social expenditures 
no longer played a central role in ensuring economic growth. In fact, social policies 
became portrayed as a cost rather than a stimulator of economic growth or a promoter 
of political and social stability. For neoliberals, inequalities were inherent in markets 
and in fact necessary to motivate economic actors.  
For neoliberals, unemployment was thus a microeconomic problem of market 
distortions linked to strong job protection, high minimum wages and generous 
unemployment insurance, rather than as a macroeconomic problem of insufficient 
demand (OECD 1997). Generous social policy was held responsible for poor 
job-search motivation and for creating a culture of dependency (Hemerijck 2012). The 
understanding of the causes of unemployment and slow growth, and thus the remedies 
put forward, therefore shifted from a demand-side to a supply-side approach. Such a 
view was accompanied by a growing demand for the role of the State to be rolled 
back, since it was perceived as too costly and inefficient, and for a reallocation of 
social responsibilities towards other social actors, such as the market, the family or 
community associations (Jenson 2012). The neoliberal perspective was oriented 
towards the future: the argument against public spending and public deficits was made 
in the name of future generations whose wellbeing should not be mortgaged.  
 
Social investment on the agenda 
Starting in the late 1990s, new ideas concerning the role and shape of social 
policy and its role in relation to the economy began to emerge, first in South and 
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Central America, some South-Eastern Asian countries, soon after taken up by 
international organisation like UNICEF or the OECD, and then spread within Europe 
(Jenson and Saint Martin 2003, Perkins, Nelms and Smyth 2004). While there is no 
unified theory and no single intellectual source behind these new ideas, and while 
different labels have been used, these different conceptions have in common the fact 
that they stress the productive potential of social policy and thus provide a new 
economic rationale for social policy provision. These ideas developed partly as a 
critique of neoliberalism but in some ways they also build on the neoliberal critique of 
the traditional post-war welfare state. Above all, the ideas put forward are based on an 
understanding that social policies need to respond to a changed economic and social 
order. 
The increasing polarization and poverty rates, including of in-work poverty, 
which appeared - especially in those countries that had gone furthest in implementing 
neoliberal policies - and the growing problem and cost of social exclusion, gave rise 
to a critique of neoliberal social prescriptions. At the same time, in Europe, the 
traditional post-war male-breadwinner welfare state came under increasing criticism, 
not least from social policy analysts who argued that the ‘old’ welfare state was 
ill-equipped to deal with the transition to post-industrialism, the social and 
demographic transformations of families and society, and the resulting emergence of 
new social risks. Likewise, the financial sustainability of not least the Continental 
European welfare states, and their capacity not to mortgage the wellbeing of future 
generations, has been severely questioned (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002).  
Traditional forms of ‘passive’ social policy intervention of the post-war welfare 
state have moreover come to be presented as out of kilter with the needs of the new 
economy, often described as the ‘knowledge economy’. It is argued that to succeed in 
this ‘knowledge economy’ it is necessary to have a highly skilled and educated 
workforce, who can quickly adapt to the constantly changing needs of the economy, 
and who is also the motor of this change thanks to its creative and innovative potential. 
In this thinking, unemployment is linked to a lack of adequate skills to fill today’s 
jobs, and this lack of adequate skills and education is also expected to stymie future 
economic growth and employment creation, unless the necessary investments are 
made to foster human capital development (OECD 1997, EU 2009). These different 
criticisms have led to calls for a modernisation of welfare systems.  
While the social investment perspective maintains a belief in the efficacy of the 
market system (Perkins et al. 2004, 2), it qualifies in important respects the neo-liberal 
belief that unfettered markets are necessarily the most appropriate and efficient 
organising principle in all circumstances. The social investment perspective 
acknowledges the importance of market failures and the need for government 
intervention and direction of market forces in order to improve both economic and 
social outcomes. Contrary to neoliberalism, the social investment perspective is based 
on a more positive theory of the State. While the State is still portrayed as a dynamic 
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entrepreneur, it is expected to have the public interest in mind (Giddens 1998). 
Furthermore, the State is assigned a key role in fostering the development of human 
capital and in providing the necessary services and benefits to help make efficient use 
of human capital and to avoid human capital depletion. 
One of the main aims of the social investment approach is to minimise the 
intergenerational transfer of poverty (Jenson 2012), but also to promote the 
intergenerational transmission of knowledge. While the policies put forward focus on 
promoting equal opportunity in the present, this is expected to produce benefits in the 
future in terms of a reduction in the intergenerational transfer of poverty and 
inequalities, but also in terms of economic and employment growth. 
By emphasising the economic benefits for society of new forms of social policy 
that invest in human capital, the social investment perspective revives the concept of 
‘productive social policy’. In fact, the European Commission has been using that 
concept of ‘productive social policy’ since 1997 (Hemerijck 2012). The economic 
arguments in favour of considering social policy as a productive factor have since 
then been put forward most notably in a report for the Employment and Social Affairs 
General Directorate of the European Commission entitled ‘Costs of non-social policy: 
towards an economic framework of quality social policies – and the costs of not 
having them’ (Fouarge 2003).  
  
The social investment perspective as an ‘emerging paradigm’ 
The social investment perspective is not yet forming a new policy paradigm on 
par with the previous ones, although there is certainly a shared new set of ideas that 
have spread across the international community at the level of international 
organisations such as the OECD, UNICEF, EU, and the World Bank (Mahon 2008, 
Jenson 2010). These ideas have also been circulated through an international 
epistemic community and integrated in the discourses and practices of most European 
governments. While there seems to be a certain convergence on the understanding of 
the nature of the problems, it is not yet entirely clear that there is a shared belief in the 
failure of neoliberalism as an economic paradigm to address the economic and social 
challenges of the early 21st century. In order to be able to assess the ‘paradigmatic 
status’ of the social investment perspective, it is warranted to do some further 
explorations of the ideas, policies and implementation of the social investment 
perspective. 
From the point of view of economic and policy ideas, the clear message is that a 
new and coherent set of ideas is emerging, even if there is some degree of ambiguity 
around some of the ideas. The social investment perspective was developed with the 
dual ambition to modernise the welfare state so as to better address the new social 
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risks and needs structure of contemporary societies and ensure the financial and 
political sustainability of the welfare state, and to sustain a knowledge-based economy. 
Central to the social investment perspective is the attempt to reconcile social and 
economic goals.  
The focus is on public policies that ‘prepare’ individuals, families, and societies 
to adapt to various transformations, such as changing career patterns and working 
conditions, the development of new social risks, population ageing and climate 
change, instead of simply generating responses to ‘repair’ damages after markets fail 
or existing policies prove inadequate. By addressing problems in their infancy, the 
social investment paradigm stands to reduce human suffering, environmental 
degradation and government debt. With regards to the modernising of the welfare 
state, the contention of the social investment perspective is that the sustainability of 
the welfare state hinges on the number and productivity of future taxpayers 
(Esping-Andersen et al. 2002, Lindh and Palme 2006). This perception of the 
problems calls for policies that broaden the tax-base by raising employment levels and 
which also increase the productivity and quality of work. A clear element of the social 
investment perspective is that investing in human capital should enable the creation of 
more and better jobs. With respect to the economic goals, social investments are 
expected to generate returns in the form of economic growth. 
 
The Social investment policies 
What kind of policies can be said to underpin the social investment perspective? 
A first policy domain relates to investment in human capital. The policy 
recommendation to invest heavily in human capital is also based on the observation of 
a causal structure where education has been shown to be the central driving variable 
for GDP growth in Europe (Lindh and Palme 2006). In light of the demonstrated 
benefits to high employment levels (Nelson and Stephens 2012), it is clear that 
policies that invest in human capital are of crucial importance. Education and training 
policies constitute the most obvious method of improving skills - particularly 
cognitive and social skills - relevant to the service-based, knowledge economy. Skill 
acquisition in formal institutions begins in early childhood education and care, and 
continues in the primary, secondary and tertiary stages of education. Skill acquisition 
during these stages of education is realized through policies that promote high 
enrolment and quality instruction. Other types of public policies, though, such as sick 
pay or generous unemployment benefits, along with adequate rehabilitation 
programmes and active labour market policies, can also protect the value of 
individuals’ skills. Human capital policies that foster the expansion of high quality 
jobs therefore include those that aid in both the acquisition of skills and the protection 
of the value of the skills already acquired. Well-designed unemployment insurance 
benefits carry the potential of also improving matching process on the labour market 
by working as search subsidies (Sjöberg et al. 2010).  
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A second policy domain relates to the relation between the productive and the 
reproductive spheres, and hinges on policies that help parents combine work and 
family life. Here the aim is both to increase labour supply by supporting mothers’ 
employment in order to foster economic growth and ensure the long-term fiscal 
sustainability of welfare systems, but also to make families less exposed to the risk of 
poverty. An underlying aim is also to enable families to realize their desired fertility. 
Policies put forward typically include childcare services and parental leave schemes. 
Of crucial importance here is the quality of the childcare services and the design and 
generosity of the parental leave schemes, both for providing children with equal 
opportunities at the earliest age and for their cognitive development, and to promote 
gender equality (Morgan 2012). 
A third policy domain focuses on employment relations, and seeks to address the 
issue of the increasingly differentiated employment patterns over the life course in 
order to reduce the probability of being trapped into inactivity and welfare 
dependency. The policy imperative is for ‘making transitions pay’ over the life cycle 
through the provision of  ‘active securities’ or ‘social bridges’, ensuring that 
non-standardized employment relations become stepping stones to sustainable 
careers’ (Hemerijck 2012).  
The focus on investing in human capital is perhaps the policy domain which 
gathers the greatest consensus amongst social investment proponents, the idea 
receiving support from neo-classical as well as heterodox economists, while policies 
to address work-family life balance appear to be more contested. If there is general 
agreement across Europe that the state should provide publicly funded primary and 
secondary education, there is less advancement in terms of reaching consensus even 
amongst social investment proponents regarding the desirability, type and extent of 
public support to enable families to reconcile work and family-life. Likewise, while 
there is strong agreement on the necessity to raise employment levels, there is some 
ambiguity regarding the means for ‘activating’ people and for promoting more 
flexibility on the labour market. 
 
The still partial and weak implementation of social investment policies in Europe 
Any attempt to assess the outcomes of social investment policies has to face the 
fact that only a few countries can be said to have implemented such policies in a 
comprehensive fashion. A second issue is that there has been no general increase in 
public expenditure on social investment type policies. Another complication is that 
some countries have implemented social investment programs with a restricted focus 
on human capital but without maintaining adequate compensatory policies.  
Drawing a distinction between compensatory and social investment-related 
expenditure helps us to broadly characterize the different welfare state configurations 
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as they appear in the early 21st century (Nikolai 2012). Contrary to the idea of a shift 
from passive to active social expenditure, the first main evidence is that while there 
has been, in OECD countries, and mostly in Europe, an increase in public social 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, this increase has not translated into an increase 
in expenditure on social investment type policies (see also Hudson and Kühner 2009). 
On the contrary, the typical social investment expenditure, education, has decreased in 
most European countries. This decrease is partly explainable by the diminishing size 
of student cohorts due to demographic changes, but it does show that there has been 
no emphasis on increasing investments in education, not least when one considers that 
the number of years in education has tended to increase. Only in the field of family 
policy has social expenditure increased.  
Beyond these common trends, ‘four worlds’ of spending profiles can be 
identified on the basis of size of the compensatory expenditures, on the one hand, and 
of social investment-related expenditures, on the other (Nikolai 2012). Countries on 
the European continent typically spend much on compensatory policies but not on 
social investment. The Nordic version of the social investment approach spends much 
on investment-related social policies as well as on old-age and passive labour market 
policies, while the UK shows a re-orientation of public social expenditure away from 
compensatory social policies towards more social investment-oriented policy domains. 
The US spends little on both (See figure one) 
Figure one: four worlds of social expenditure 
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These findings, based on the analysis of expenditure data, are confirmed by 
detailed and qualitative analysis of recent policy developments (De la Porte and 
Jacobsson 2012). In terms of employment policies, what has been implemented 
among the EU Member States is mostly policies primarily aimed at pushing people 
back to the labour market, to take any jobs, without paying enough attention to 
qualification, training and the quality of the jobs offered. Conditionality in 
unemployment insurance has been increased in most Member States, replacement 
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rates have been retrenched, and the duration of benefit periods shortened. Activation 
schemes are far from comprehensive, workfarist rather than individualized, and come  
in the form of counselling rather than comprehensive training.  
However, the experience of the Nordic countries suggests that social investment 
policies can be used to successfully combine social and economic goals. These 
countries display high and broad-based education levels, which appear to translate 
into high levels of social capital and social cohesion, greater learning and innovation 
capacity at work (making these countries amongst the most competitive economies in 
the world), more flexibility on the labour market, good economic growth including 
the creation of more and better jobs. These countries also show higher female 
employment rates, lower poverty rates, including lower transmission of 
intergenerational poverty and have been dealing successfully with demographic issues, 
both in terms of providing care for the elderly and in maintaining fertility levels. 
These countries are also the most successful when it comes to implementing climate 
mitigation policies (Sommestad 2012). The key to this success seems to be the fact 
that the Nordic countries have not pursued a simple re-orientation strategy with their 
welfare systems towards more activation but have instead combined strong protection 
with heavy social investment, with the aim to promote social as well as gender 
equality. 
Despite these examples of ‘good practice’, the general picture is that only a few 
countries have really embraced a social investment approach for the welfare states. If 
the social investment paradigm is to emerge as a fully-fledged paradigm, then a 
number of issues obviously need to be addressed. 
 
The social investment perspective and its critics 
A first set of critiques relates to the socio-economic consequences of the social 
investment strategy’s focus on the future. Briefly stated, the argument is that the focus 
on investing for future returns has too often meant rechanneling expenditure from 
‘passive’ social security benefits (ie social benefits aimed at income support) to 
activation and spending in the fields of family-oriented services and education. This 
has meant that today’s poor have been left aside. Such a rechanneling may have 
contributed to increase poverty in many countries as social spending has become less 
adequate in relieving poverty and as it is merely focused at supporting families whose 
members are working (Cantillon 2010). 
A second, and related, critique has to do with the strong emphasis on activation 
that characterizes the social investment perspective and which has both offered a 
justification for cutting back on benefits that previously allowed certain groups to 
remain outside the labour market (such as lone parents or people on long-term 
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sickness leave) and also meant that the issue of the quality of work has been sidelined 
in favour of ‘any jobs’. In many countries such as the UK, the US and Eastern 
European countries, active labour market policies have represented more of a 
continuation of neoliberal ‘workfare’ policies than a shift towards upskilling and the 
development of ‘more and better jobs’ (Bonoli 2012). 
A third critique concerns the way the social inclusion or social cohesion aspect 
seems to have been paid lip-service in the actual implementation of the strategy, not 
least at the EU level. Indeed, the policy instruments appear to have been 
underdeveloped in strategic terms, as well as in terms of resource allocation (Lundvall 
and Lorenz 2012b). 
A fourth critique has been put forward by feminists and gender theorists who 
have highlighted the kind of biased utilisation of gender equality policies, and 
especially policies for reconciling work and family life, that the social investment 
strategy has given rise to. Indeed, several commentators have noted how the focus on 
increasing women’s employment levels has been motivated by economic objectives 
rather than by a real concern with women’s aspirations (Stratigaki 2004). Jenson 
(2009) has also highlighted some of the ambiguities linked to this strategy’s focus on 
the future: while it addresses the needs of children, including girls, the focus on the 
future means that the situation of women today is not really addressed, other than in 
their reproductive capacity.  
Fifthly, the gender critique feeds into an even broader concern with the way 
social goals and the social citizenship rights perspective that underpins the social 
investment approach have sometimes been harnessed to an economic agenda. Also 
children have become merely perceived as ‘citizen-workers’ of the future rather than 
as ‘citizen-children’ of the present, i.e. as ‘becomings’ rather than as ‘beings’ with 
social rights in their own right, as (non-productive) children (Lister 2003). The social 
or humanitarian rationale for social policy has too often been replaced by an 
economic rationale (Midgley and Tang 2001). 
 
Core features of a successful social investment approach 
If one wants to successfully implement a social investment perspectives and 
reach its explicit goals (a sustainable economic growth combined with social 
cohesion), one has to underline four crucial points. To begin with, it is necessary to 
clearly distinguish the social investment perspective from neo-liberalism. Secondly, 
equality is a crucial element of a successful social investment approach. Thirdly, the 
lesson to be drawn is also that there is a need to focus on quality (and especially 
quality of jobs), when it comes to both policy design and implementation. Fourthly, 
equally important is the understanding that protection must remain an important 
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function of the welfare state that works as a necessary complement to activation and 
cannot be substituted by activation.  
For neoliberals, unemployment is understood as a problem of supply and 
incentives and of too much labour market protection hampering the needed flexibility 
in the new economy. As such it is no surprise that the neoliberal reform agenda has 
been aimed at deregulating the labour market, lowering pay-roll taxes, reducing 
labour costs and increasing incentives to accept jobs by reducing the level of 
unemployment and assistance benefits to ‘make work pay’. Yet, these reforms have 
not created ‘more and better jobs’ but rather jobs that are giving rise to the ‘working 
poor’ phenomenon, and which do not generate the tax revenues needed to sustain and 
improve the social protection model of ageing European societies. Such a strategy 
fails to recognise the problem of lack of adequate qualifications.  
The fact that the unemployed are predominantly unskilled and that vacant jobs 
require high skills suggests that, in these times of ‘aftershock’, we need to 
complement demand-oriented Keynesian measures with supply side-oriented 
instruments that go beyond the neo-liberal deregulation of labour markets, lowering of 
labour costs and provision of incentives for the unemployed to take poorly paid jobs. 
We need instead to upskill the unemployed by providing them with the necessary 
learning capacities. We need here to emphasise again the importance of education, 
training, skill formation, maintenance and updating of skills as policies preparing 
individuals for the current and future economy. In this context, the fact that there is a 
large variation among countries, particularly when it comes to the skill-levels of the 
‘low-skilled’ opens up for policy learning (Nelson and Stephens 2012).  
While there is evidence showing the positive effects of increasing education and 
skill levels on employment (Nelson and Stephens 2012, Lundvall and Lorenz 2012a) 
– both in terms of increasing employment levels and in terms of creating ‘good jobs’ 
– it is evident that in most European countries this strategy has not been followed yet 
(Bonoli 2012).  
If we want to not only reduce unemployment but also promote employment 
growth (especially in ‘good jobs’), while also promoting social cohesion rather than 
polarisation, it is important to go beyond neoliberal labour market policies and 
consider seriously the need to invest in skills that enhance the capacity to learn 
(Lundvall and Lorenz 2012a). This is best done through policies that are broad-based, 
egalitarian and of high quality, and that follow the whole life-course, starting with 
early childhood education and care (Nelson and Stephens 2012). The social 
investment approach is a ‘package-deal’, implying that partial implementation may at 
best deliver a partial success. The life course perspective suggests that policies can be 
effective only if the whole chain is maintained, and if it is aimed at the whole 
population and not reserved for the select few. 
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The relationship between social investment and equality appears vital to address 
on several accounts. Indeed, it is a desirable outcome of social policy if one takes 
seriously the wish expressed by social investment proponents to address the new 
social risks structure of contemporary societies, to reduce intergenerational poverty 
and provide individuals and families with more equal capacities to invest in their own 
human capital and that of their children so that they can maintain responsibility for 
their wellbeing via market income. It also appears to be a necessary precondition for 
promoting growth and employment, especially in good quality jobs. 
Social investment and equality 
At stake here is both equality of access (to quality childcare, to education, to 
life-long training, to quality health and care services) and income equality. Egalitarian 
societies appear more successful in implementing social investment policies and in 
achieving many of the desired outcomes linked to this strategy, including in terms of 
climate change mitigation policies (Sommestad 2012). Thus it is not just equality of 
opportunity but also equality of outcomes that matters. The fact that equality appears 
to be a precondition for a successful social investment strategy urges us to remember 
the merits of traditional social protection and anti-poverty programs, and suggests that 
reduction of income inequality should remain high on the social investment agenda. 
Another element that needs to be made more central on the social investment 
agenda is that of gender equality. While gender awareness is at the very heart of the 
social investment perspective, focusing as it is on women’s economic contributions 
and reproductive role and care work, Jenson has forcefully demonstrated the extent to 
which equality of condition or even equal opportunities for women and men have 
been side-tracked as policy goals in their own right within this perspective (Jenson 
2009). Thus, while many countries have successfully managed to achieve high female 
employment rates, and some have even managed to combine these high employment 
rates with moderate to high fertility rates, none have thus far managed to – or sought 
to – effectively address certain persistent gender inequalities such as the division of 
unpaid care and household labour, the gender wage gap, labour market segregation 
and the ‘glass ceiling effect’ for women. Addressing this issue means that special 
attention must be paid to the specific design of policies that seek to promote women’s 
employment and to reconciling work and family life (Morgan 2012). 
Likewise, more attention needs to be devoted to the structural and political 
factors that contribute to the kind of ethnic inequalities that characterize European 
societies today and which are likely to be of increasing importance in the future if not 
properly addressed (Emmeneger and Cajera 2011). This is in fact an area where the 
Nordic countries do not perform very well. While they do better than other European 
countries in terms of fostering equality in the educational system (Diamond and 
Liddle 2012), integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities on the labour market is 
quite poor, and unemployment rates for these groups are consequently high. This 
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means that integration efforts in these countries must be even greater and focused 
upon upgrading the skills, including the communication skills of immigrants. 
However, if the skill gap is too big, as suggested by Bonoli (2012), there may be good 
reasons for also developing subsidized jobs for the least skilled – although such 
subsidies should be made conditional on the quality of the jobs thus subsidized, i.e. 
such subsidies should not simply allow employers to take advantage of ‘cheap 
labour’. 
 
Quality should be another crucial component of a true social investment strategy. 
This relates both to the quality of jobs but also to the quality of services. Only high 
quality childcare can foster good cognitive skill acquisition amongst all children and 
help reduce social inequalities (Morgan 2012). Participation in a course of education 
does not directly translate into high achievement, what matters is the quality of 
education more than simple participation for skill accumulation, particularly at the 
low end of the capability distribution (Nelson and Stephens 2012). 
Social investment and quality 
When it comes to active labour market policies, Bonoli (2012) shows how 
policies directed only towards activation, in the sense of pushing people back onto the 
labour market to take up ‘any job’ - as in the neo-liberal strategy, have not produced 
good results. While employment rates have generally increased over the 2000s in 
Europe, the quality of the jobs created has very often been of low quality (Guillen and 
Dahl 2009), taking the shape of atypical jobs, short term contracts, interim work, short 
part-time, etc., which has resulted in increased in-work poverty (Eichhorst and Marx 
2011). Thus active labour market policy can be considered as part of a social 
investment strategy only if conceived of as an instrument of social promotion, and not 
only as a way to increase employment rates at any cost. Amongst the various active 
labour market measures, only the upskilling ones seem to fit the social investment 
approach. Activation is not enough. 
This is all the more important since if the quality of jobs is forgotten, activation 
only leads to shifting people from inactivity into in-work poverty, which does not 
reach the economic goal of increasing employment rates in order to increase the tax 
base and support future pensions and health care costs. Furthermore, given the 
challenges of economic globalisation, one way to remain competitive on the world 
market is through innovation, and the production of goods and services of high quality 
(Lundvall and Lorenz 2012a).  
Investing in quality means that substantial investments must be made to improve 
education, training and up-skilling schemes, as well as to improve working conditions. 
This in turn means that more, rather than less, social spending or, rather, investment is 
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needed. The fact that an effective social investment strategy in the short run entails 
increasing social expenditure cannot be ignored, all the more so as it appears clear 
that it cannot be enough to re-orient social expenditure towards only ‘activation’ 
programmes (programmes conditioning social benefits to the search of work), it is 
equally important that the welfare state also retains its traditional protection functions. 
In this respect, it is important to recognize that compensation and activation may 
affect social inclusion in different directions. By providing adequate compensation, 
social benefits protect persons from poverty and the negative effects that low income 
has on social inclusion. On the other hand, in the absence of measures aimed at 
fostering employability, social protection may have unintended effects and increase 
benefit dependency and thus social exclusion in the sphere of employment. There is 
therefore a fine balance to be held between protection and activation programmes in 
the form of retraining and/or rehabilitation in order to promote employment, without 
increasing poverty and social exclusion (Palme et al. 2009). 
Promotion and protection 
Social policy and labour market reforms which combine security for the workers 
and flexibility of the labour market (policies often termed: “flexicurity”), as it has 
developed in the Nordic countries and in the Netherlands, appears as a useful way to 
reconcile protection and activation (Lorenz and Lundvall 2012a), although that 
depends on the precise design of flexicurity schemes (de la Porte and Jacobsson 2012). 
As is now widely acknowledged, ‘high unemployment benefits of short duration, 
coupled to strong activation incentives and obligations, supported by active labour 
market servicing policy are most successful in lowering unemployment and raising 
labour productivity’ (Hemerijck, 2012). This means that the recasting of the welfare 
state should not be reduced to ‘transform[ing] the safety net of entitlements into a 
springboard to personal responsibility’ (Blair and Schröder 2000) but rather about 
forming social policies so that they act as a ‘bridge of change’, resting on several 
pillars: investment in human capital and social protection and activation. 
Such a strategy requires that more rather than fewer resources be devoted to 
social policy. This may well appear problematic in Europe in the aftermath of the 
2008 financial crisis and in a time viewed as a period of financial austerity. Yet there 
are good reasons for changing the way such expenditure is considered, and to take 
seriously the idea that these social expenditures are in fact investments, from which 
productive and economic benefits can be derived. This therefore calls for a new 
economic thinking to underpin the social investment perspective. In fact, the absence 
so far of such new economic thinking can be said to be one reason why the social 
investment perspective has not yet developed into a fully-fledged paradigm like 
Keynesianism and neo-liberalism. 
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A paradigm in search of a new economic model 
The social investment approach is in need for a new economic turn and thinking, 
including both a theoretical and a collective action dimension, which also warrants an 
analysis of its own political economy. Past social policy approaches have been 
integrated with economic theories of different kinds. This suggests that we need to go 
beyond Keynesian and neo-classical economic theories and anchor the social 
investment approach in a new economic model. Here it is obvious that the social 
investment approach is so far not on par with either Keynesianism or neo-liberalism, 
which suggests that the most evident need is to fill the macroeconomic gap. It also 
means that the success of a new social investment agenda depends on it being broad 
enough not only to match but also to supersede past approaches.  
Where are the elements for the ‘new’ economic thinking? One important element 
is to be found in our accounting methods. If we take seriously the idea that social 
outlays can yield long-run dividends for both individuals and society as a whole, then 
there is a good case to be made for counting such outlays as productive investments 
rather than as consumption. This in turn means that we need to develop a new 
National Accounts System (Lindh 2012). There are also new forms of economic 
activity that urge us to rethink our ways of measuring productivity. This applies to 
personal services and to Information and Communication Technology (ICT) related 
production, as well as to green technologies. 
Likewise, the rationale behind the ‘Beyond GDP’ agenda as formulated in the 
Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Report (2009) is that current developmental challenges demand 
new and improved socio-economic indicators to guide policy makers. As the authors 
remind us, what we measure affects our view of the world and in the end what we do. 
If our measurements are flawed, decisions may be distorted. Thus, for instance, 
conflict regarding choices between promoting growth and protecting the environment 
may be dissolved once environmental degradation is appropriately included in our 
measurement of economic performance. Among other things the report points out that 
it is often unclear how current indicators relate to each other and that social 
dimensions tend to be missing. The concept of sustainable development is useful in 
this context with its future oriented and intergenerational focus: ‘development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs’ (The Brundtland Commission 1987).  
Models including human capital accumulation (such as endogenous growth) 
could be seen as one source of inspiration for a new economic model, as could the 
concept of sustainable growth (Sommestad 2012). But a new economic model also 
demands a deeper understanding of the transformation of capitalism, an improved 
vision of what the ‘new’ economy is, that goes beyond the concept of just being 
‘post-industrial’. The reformulation of the ‘knowledge based economy’ as the 
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‘learning economy’ is one fruitful conceptual contribution (Lundvall and Lorenz 
2012a). The ‘green economy’ is another potentially useful metaphor. 
Policies in search for a political majority 
The lack of a fully-fledged economic theory or model is only one reason why the 
social investment approach has not gained more ground in Europe despite the 
widespread ideas. Another reason seems to be the lack of clear political coalitions and 
entrepreneurship to back it up. The fact that since the social investment ideas have 
been elaborated and promoted, few countries have known either left governments or 
encompassing party coalitions working hand in hand with encompassing unions may 
partly explain the lack of implementation of social investment policies beyond 
traditionally social-democratic countries. Another reason is that the social investment 
approach is naturally targeting children, youth, women, migrants and the unemployed, 
which do not constitute any clear or coherent political constituency, making it 
difficult to see which political coalitions would support it. 
This is not to suggest that there is only one political path to social investment. 
Quite the contrary, the ambiguities of the perspective open up for a broader set of 
political actors, and in so far as there are achievements of the social investment 
approach that are attractive, why should it not be possible to learn from ‘best practice’?  
In fact, it seems that the political triggers for the promotion of social investment-type 
programmes have often been of a substantive rather than ideological nature. In this 
respect, demographic arguments seem to have mattered a lot (Lindh 2012). If Morgan 
(2012) is right about the changing electoral base for political parties and the growing 
competition for the female votes, this may bring social investment related issues on 
the agenda, particularly around the care and education of young children. Here the 
ambiguity that characterizes the social investment perspective also carries some 
potential by offering an opportunity to build policy-coalitions between partners who 
have very different world-views. It might not be necessary for everyone to recognize 
the failure of neoliberalism as a paradigm in order to support policies or programmes 
that are clearly outside the neoliberal box. The problem is that such an approach risks 
remaining partial and lacking in the kind of synergies suggested by our ‘package’ 
argument. 
 
What future for the social investment welfare state? 
Based on the relatively modest advancement of implementation of genuine social 
investment policies, it is tempting to draw the conclusion that it has no future. While 
this may be the end of the story, one should, for the time being, not deny that there are 
different and alternative ‘change scenarios’ that can be identified. The first big 
challenge for the social investment perspective is to become a coherent and 
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convincing economic and social policy paradigm for the years to come and be 
adopted by most governments in Europe.  
According to Hall’s (1993) approach to changes in policy paradigms, adopting a 
new paradigm is the last of a three phases process of a shift form an old to a new 
policy paradigm. We have not reached the third phase yet, since there is still no 
general agreement that the neo-liberal solutions are the wrong ones to face the 
challenges of our current times. The bad news is that we may therefore be facing an 
even deeper economic crisis since neo-liberal solutions cannot solve our current 
problems but will, on the contrary, lead to more difficulties. This in turn may trigger a 
deep political crisis, leading to a paradigmatic shift away from neo-liberalism. The 
outcome of a political crisis cannot, however, be predicted with any certainty. While 
such a crisis could pave the way towards a social investment paradigm, it might 
alternatively trigger a turn to protectionism and nationalist xenophobic policies. Wide 
public unrest and riots are other possible scenarios.  
In the past few years, Germany has also provided an alternative socio-economic 
model to social investment, in which increasing competitiveness by reducing the cost 
and social protection of labour, and fiscal discipline are core components. Germany’s 
success in considerably reducing unemployment levels, and the country’s position as 
the main engine of growth in the Eurozone, makes the German model a credible 
competitor to the social investment perspective. Yet this economic success hides 
growing inequalities and a dualisation process between protected insiders in ‘good 
jobs’ and an increasing mass of outsiders in atypical jobs with low incomes and poor 
social protection (Palier and Thelen 2010). This strategy will in the long-run, with too 
many negative externalities involved in terms of increased in-work poverty, social and 
economic dualisms, and an orientation towards low-skilled, low-quality jobs which 
cannot remain competitive in the long-run in the global economy. 
An alternative and more optimistic view on the likelihood of the social 
investment paradigm ‘winning the day’ as a new socio-economic paradigm, is based 
on the contention that important changes take place incrementally rather than through 
a policy revolution. Against the idea that paradigmatic change is inevitably a result of 
a rupture in the past equilibrium, there is now ample evidence that paradigmatic shifts 
more often come about through an accumulation of incremental but cumulatively 
transformative reforms (Streeck and Thelen 2005, Palier 2010). Eventually we also 
need reforms to circumvent piecemeal engineering and move beyond institutional and 
political obstacles. We not only need to make available elements of a new social and 
economic policy paradigm but also to suggest how they can be fitted together.   
Moreover, for actually achieving policy change, we not only need a renewed political 
coalition involving new and old social risks bearers but also political entrepreneurs at 
different political levels to act as agents of change. Here the association with climate 
change mitigation policies provides an interesting opening with the focus on 
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sustainable growth. It might be that in this context we can find a new political 
coalition to carry the social investment agenda. 
Even if we take the social investment approach seriously and engage in the kind 
of massive implementation of investment policies such a strategy calls for, a number 
of policy dilemmas might still appear in front of us. If not properly designed and 
packaged, social investment policies might threaten to crowd out redistributive 
anti-poverty policies of different kinds, might withdraw vital demand for consumption 
in the post-crisis, and might threaten the restoration of a balance in the public finances. 
Here it is important to emphasise that the notion of social investment warrants us to 
think beyond the traditional human capital framework when it comes to both policy 
instruments and goals. This also requires us to rethink the usual time horizon for 
policy-making as this is a precondition for sustainable development. At the same time, 
the role of the state as social investor is confronted with the process of globalisation, 
both in terms of its capacity to raise resources and in terms of opening up its welfare 
system to immigrants. At any rate, properly designed social investment policies have 
the potential to promote social inclusion and social capital as well as social cohesion. 
These are assets modern societies have good reasons to nurture in order to promote 
societal progress that is sustainable, recognizing the interdependencies of the 
economic, environmental, political and social aspects of it. 
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